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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
         Carol Aman and Jeanette Johnson appeal from the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Cort 
Furniture Rental Corporation on their employment discrimination 
claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C.  2000e, et seq, and the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-12, et seq.  They argue that 
the record contains evidence from which a jury could conclude:  
(1) that while employed at Cort Furniture, they were subject to a 
hostile work environment; (2) that Aman was constructively 
discharged; (3) that Johnson was discharged in retaliation for 
protesting discrimination at Cort Furniture; and (4) that black 
employees were paid less than similarly situated white employees. 
         For the reasons which follow, we will reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment as to Aman's and 
Johnson's hostile environment, constructive discharge and 
retaliatory discharge claims, and will affirm its judgment as to 
their unequal pay claims. 
                                I. 
         Carol Aman and Jeanette Johnson, both black, were hired 
by Cort Furniture's Philadelphia district office in 1986.  Aman 
was hired as a bookkeeper and Johnson was hired as a credit 
manager.  Both Aman and Johnson claim that during their 
employment at Cort Furniture, they were subjected to an 
atmosphere of racial contempt and harassment.  Aman claims that 
this resulted in her constructive discharge.  Johnson claims that 
she was discharged in retaliation for complaining about Cort 
Furniture's discriminatory practices. 
     From 1986 through the termination of their employment 
in 1992, Aman and Johnson claim that co-workers and managers 
engaged in a pervasive and systematic pattern of harassment 
toward black employees.  Aman and other black employees were 
referred to as "another one," "one of them," and "poor people."  
Aman was also the target of at least three false accusations of 
favoritism allegedly exhibited toward her by her black 
supervisor, as well as dereliction of duty.  On several 
occasions, co-workers physically snatched documents from Aman's 
hands and stole time cards that she needed to perform her job. 
     This behavior, however, was not limited to Aman and 
Johnson's co-workers; it was engaged in by management as well.  
For example, both Aman and Johnson heard Allen Shuttleworth, 
Regional Vice-President of Cort Furniture, make disparaging 
racial remarks about their supervisor, Joyce Lampkin.  On one 
occasion, Shuttleworth came into the office and asked the white 
employees on Lampkin's staff, "Where is that one in there?" 
     Despite this harassment, in 1989 Aman was promoted to 
the position of credit manager, and Johnson became supervisor of 
the administrative department after Lampkin moved to the sales 
department.  As a credit manager Aman was responsible for 
approving credit and collecting on past due accounts.  Cort 
Furniture salespeople were required to submit credit applications 
to a credit clerk, who would run a credit check in order to 
determine whether to grant credit to the customer.  After these 
promotions, Johnson became Aman's immediate supervisor.  In 
November of that year, Johnson received a letter from the 
president of Cort Furniture congratulating her for her 
outstanding performance and for the performance of the 
department. 
     Aman's new position as credit manager did nothing to 
increase the respect of her fellow employees.  She continued to 
suffer harassment from white sales staff and management, 
including Karen Brady, Lisa Jentsch, Katie Gauthier, Laura 
Greathead, Chris Benzle, Robert Kurtz, and Barry Boswell.  
According to Aman, the general atmosphere of racial hostility 
"lead [sic] white employees to feel confident that what they said 
would be listened to over black and made the whites uncooperative 
and unsupportive to blacks."  As examples, Aman and Johnson point 
to the fact that Benzle instructed Johnson to put a derogatory 
memorandum in Aman's personnel file because he wanted Aman "out."  
Brady, Jentsch, and Greathead bypassed Aman and extended credit 
to customers against Cort Furniture policy, and there is no 
evidence that any of them were reprimanded for their behavior.  
In addition, Boswell, the sales manager, continually ignored 
Aman's requests for information necessary to her job.  He also 
allegedly harassed Aman and another black employee by making them 
do menial tasks which were not within their job descriptions, 
such as running his personal errands.  There is no evidence to 
indicate that he ever asked similarly situated white employees to 
do those tasks. 
     On one particular occasion, while Aman was using the 
restroom, Gauthier, a sales representative, demanded that Aman 
approve a credit application immediately.  Aman replied, "Katie, 
have you heard the latest, Lincoln freed slaves?"  In response to 
that remark Gauthier complained to Shuttleworth, who refused to 
speak to Aman from that day forward.  Shuttleworth then 
approached Johnson and told her that "Aman has got to go."  In 
response to this dispute, Jim Newton, the controller, called 
Johnson and stated that "if this continues we're going to have to 
come up there and get rid of all of you."  When Johnson asked 
what he meant by "all of you," Newton refused to elaborate.  
During this conversation, Johnson informed Newton that the racial 
problems at Cort Furniture were getting out of control. 
     In meetings with Boswell and Kurtz, Johnson informed 
Cort Furniture's management that salespeople were harassing and 
insulting black warehouse employees by constantly telling them 
"Don't touch anything" in customers' homes and "Don't steal."  
Johnson also asked why black employees were being paid less than 
white employees, but was told only that that was a Human 
Resources Department issue. 
     When Kurtz became general manager in June of 1991, the 
harassment apparently increased.  Kurtz began to yell at Aman on 
a regular basis.  When he met with Aman for the first time as 
general manager, Kurtz told her that he "knew all about" Aman, 
Jeanette Johnson, and Bruce Buchanan.  The only thing these three 
employees had in common was that they were black.  Until Aman 
departed, Kurtz subjected her to careful scrutiny whenever she 
interacted with white female employees. 
     Johnson was also the focus of Kurtz's harassment.  
According to Johnson, Kurtz made it known that he had offered her 
job to a white employee.  Kurtz then made it more difficult for 
her to perform her job by withholding necessary financial 
information.  On one occasion, as a result of conflicting 
instructions from Kurtz and Newton, Newton apparently slammed 
Johnson's door and yelled at her.  While he later apologized, 
Newton admitted that he never treated anyone else in the same 
manner. 
     During August of 1991, the racial problems at Cort 
Furniture appeared to be coming to a head.  Kurtz received a 
letter of complaint about Aman from Stephen Urbish, a customer of 
Cort Furniture.  After another incident between Kurtz and Aman in 
which Kurtz yelled at her in front of the entire office, he 
refused to discuss business matters with Aman, and instead 
informed her that he was receiving complaints about her. 
     On October 10, 1991, Kurtz forced Johnson to issue a 
formal warning to Aman, despite Johnson's objection.  Although 
the warning stated that customers had complained about Aman, 
Johnson could recall but a single complaint, one in which a 
customer complained that he did not appreciate being called and 
told that he owed money.  Later, Johnson was instructed to give 
Aman a work plan which required Johnson to spend two hours 
everyday monitoring Aman.  Johnson informed Cort Furniture that 
it was her opinion that the work plan was unnecessary, but was 
forced to comply in order to keep her job. 
     On October 18, 1991, Aman's counsel sent a letter to 
Cort Furniture complaining of discrimination against Aman.  Later 
that month in a district meeting attended by all administrative, 
sales and warehouse employees, Kurtz allegedly stated that "the 
blacks are against the whites," and that if anyone didn't like it 
at Cort Furniture, they could leave. 
     In January of 1992, Kurtz once again became angry with 
Aman, this time for not granting credit approval for a project 
which would have contradicted prior instructions she had 
received.  In February, Aman resigned after giving four days 
notice, and filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.  Aman 
testified that the hostile environment in which she worked had 
forced her to see a doctor for nervousness three times in 1991 
and once in 1992. 
     Johnson also observed the discriminatory treatment of 
other black employees.  Johnson testified that every time she 
hired a black person at Cort Furniture, there were complaints 
from salespeople and general managers about that person's 
performance.  In addition, in 1991 she personally witnessed the 
firing of James Washington, a black warehouse employee, who was 
terminated for accepting a tip from a customer, while on the same 
day a white warehouse employee failed his third drug test but was 
kept on in violation of company policy.  In 1992, Johnson was 
forced to terminate Robin Flagg, a black customer service 
representative.  According to Johnson, Flagg's only offense was 
that she had not received the training from Cort Furniture which 
would have enabled her properly to do her job.  Also in 1992, 
Johnson was forced to terminate a black warehouseman for too many 
accidents, even though at least one other white warehouseman with 
as many accidents was not fired. 
     After Aman resigned, Kurtz told Johnson to "hire an 
Italian, they won't take no for an answer."  She was also 
instructed by members of management, including Tom Rogers and 
Regional Vice-President Shuttleworth, to gather as much 
derogatory information about Aman as she could.  Johnson informed 
them that all relevant information was already in Aman's 
personnel file, but management persisted.  Johnson was told that 
Aman had filed a complaint with the EEOC, and they needed this 
information in order to prevail. 
     In response to Aman's discrimination charge, Cort 
Furniture required the depositions of several employees, 
including Johnson.  Shuttleworth telephoned Johnson on August 7, 
1992, and asked her to give a statement the following week.  When 
Johnson informed him that she would be on vacation until the 
17th, he said that they would get in touch with her when she 
returned.  On Sunday, August 16th, the day before Johnson was 
supposed to return to work following her vacation, Shuttleworth 
called Johnson at her home at 9:30 p.m. and informed her that she 
was scheduled for a deposition the following afternoon.  
According to Johnson, this was the first time anyone ever 
mentioned the term "deposition" to her. 
     The next morning, Johnson telephoned Human Resources 
and eventually spoke with Kim Martin, an employee in the 
department.  Johnson informed Martin that she wanted to speak to 
her attorney and to other people in Human Resources before she 
proceeded with the deposition.  Martin responded that Johnson's 
proposal was acceptable, as long as she realized Cort Furniture 
would still want her to give a deposition.  Johnson replied that 
she did not have a problem with giving a deposition once she knew 
what her rights were.  After missing her scheduled deposition, 
Johnson was fired.  Johnson was advised that she had been 
terminated because her failure to attend the deposition proved 
"that you are not loyal to this company." 
     Aman and Johnson filed this suit against Cort Furniture 
alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  They alleged that Cort 
Furniture created a racially hostile work environment, paid 
blacks less than whites, constructively discharged Aman, and 
fired Johnson in retaliation for protesting discriminatory 
practices.  Cort Furniture moved for summary judgment on the 
Title VII claims, and the district court granted Cort Furniture's 
motion.  The court found that Aman and Johnson had failed to 
establish a claim of hostile environment because the evidence 
demonstrated only rudeness, and not racial animus; that they had 
failed to demonstrate that they were paid less than similarly 
situated white employees; that Aman had failed to demonstrate 
that a reasonable person would have resigned; and that Johnson 
had failed to present any evidence to demonstrate that she was 
fired for participating in protected activity.  The district 
court then dismissed Aman and Johnson's state claims with 
prejudice.  This appeal followed. 
                               II. 
     We have held repeatedly that the party moving for 
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) bears the burden of 
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.  
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Chipollini v. 
Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir. 1987).  This 
burden remains with "the moving party regardless of which party 
would have the burden of persuasion at trial."  Chipollini, 814 
F.2d at 896. 
     As we noted at the outset (and as our factual 
recitation in Part I of this opinion would indicate), when 
determining whether the moving party has proven the absence of a 
genuine material issue of fact, the facts asserted by the 
nonmoving party, if supported by affidavits or other evidentiary 
material, must be regarded as true, Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 
(3d Cir. 1976); and "the inferences to be drawn from the 
underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion."  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 
(quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 
(1962)) (emphasis added); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n.2 ("any 
doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial should be 
resolved against the moving party.").  Viewed under this lens, 
"[i]f . . . there is any evidence in the record from any source 
from which a reasonable inference in the [nonmoving party's] 
favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a 
summary judgment . . . ."  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n.2 (quoting 
In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 
238, 258 (1983), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita, 
475 U.S. 574 (1986)). 
     A district court's grant of summary judgment is subject 
to plenary review, Public Interest Research of N.J. v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1990), and we 
are required "to apply the same test the district court should 
have utilized initially."  Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 
F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Berner Int'l Corp. v. Mars 
Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1993); and J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. 
Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1530 (3d Cir. 1990). 
     On summary judgment, Cort Furniture does not challenge 
the factual basis of Aman and Johnson's supporting evidence, but 
claims instead that even if their evidence is true, it would be 
insufficient to establish impermissible employment practices 
under Title VII.  Cort Furniture is, therefore, required to 
demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record upon which 
any reasonable jury could conclude that discrimination occurred.  
For the following reasons, we conclude that Cort Furniture failed 
to carry its burden. 
                      III.  Title VII Claims 
                     A.  Hostile Environment. 
         In order to establish a claim for employment 
discrimination due to an intimidating or offensive work 
environment, a plaintiff must establish, "by the totality of the 
circumstances, the existence of a hostile or abusive environmentwhich is 
severe enough to affect the psychological stability of a 
minority employee."  Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 
1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. 
and Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989)).  
Specifically, a plaintiff must show:  (1) that he or she suffered 
intentional discrimination because of race; (2) the 
discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination 
detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination 
would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same race 
in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior 
liability.  Id.; West Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 
(3d Cir. 1995).  As the Supreme Court has emphasized: 
         whether an environment is "hostile" or 
         "abusive" can be determined only by looking 
         at the circumstances.  These may include the 
         frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 
         severity; whether it is physically 
         threatening or humiliating, or a mere 
         offensive utterance; and whether it 
         unreasonably interferes with an employee's 
         work performance. 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371, 126 
L.Ed.2d 295, 302 (1993). 
         The issue in this case is whether the district court 
correctly determined that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 
that they suffered from intentional racial discrimination or that 
the discrimination was pervasive and regular. 
         In many respects, the facts of this case represent what 
has become the typical Title VII employment discrimination case 
of this decade.  Anti-discrimination laws and lawsuits have 
"educated" would-be violators such that extreme manifestations of 
discrimination are thankfully rare.  Though they still happen, 
the instances in which employers and employees openly use 
derogatory epithets to refer to fellow employees appear to be 
declining.  Regrettably, however, this in no way suggests that 
discrimination based upon an individual's race, gender, or age is 
near an end.  Discrimination continues to pollute the social and 
economic mainstream of American life, and is often simply masked 
in more subtle forms.  It has become easier to coat various forms 
of discrimination with the appearance of propriety, or to ascribe 
some other less odious intention to what is in reality 
discriminatory behavior.  In other words, while discriminatory 
conduct persists, violators have learned not to leave the 
proverbial "smoking gun" behind.  As one court has recognized, 
"[d]efendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit 
discriminatory animus or leave a paper trail demonstrating it."  
Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987).  But 
regardless of the form that discrimination takes, the 
impermissible impact remains the same, and the law's prohibition 
remains unchanged.  "Title VII tolerates no racial 
discrimination, subtle or otherwise."  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 793, 801 (1973). 
         The sophisticated would-be violator has made our job a 
little more difficult.  Courts today must be increasingly 
vigilant in their efforts to ensure that prohibited 
discrimination is not approved under the auspices of legitimate 
conduct, and "a plaintiff's ability to prove discrimination 
indirectly, circumstantially, must not be crippled . . . because 
of crabbed notions of relevance or excessive mistrust of juries."  
Riordan, 831 F.2d at 698. 
         Considered in the light most favorable to them, Aman 
and Johnson have produced sufficient evidence so that a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the working environment at 
Cort Furniture was pervaded by discriminatory "intimidation, 
ridicule, and insult."  Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370, 126 L.Ed.2d at 
301.  The plaintiffs' evidence demonstrates that from 1986 
through 1992, employees of Cort Furniture made inherently racist 
remarks.  Aman and Johnson were referred to as "another one," 
"one of them," "that one in there," and "all of you."  Other 
black employees were harassed on a daily basis by employees at 
Cort Furniture, who hurled insults such as "don't touch 
anything," and "don't steal."  Aman and Johnson were also 
subjected to apparently false accusations of favoritism, 
incompetence, and were made to do menial jobs.  The evidence of 
record shows that white employees were not treated in a similar 
fashion.  In addition, several employees refused to deal with 
Aman even in matters where she was directly responsible for 
approving a customer's credit, and these employees were never 
reprimanded even though their actions were in direct violation of 
company policy. 
         Cort Furniture argued, and the district court agreed, 
that any racial harassment ended in 1989 because by then many of 
the individuals who had made these remarks were no longer 
employed by Cort Furniture.  If that were true, then Aman and 
Johnson's claims based solely on those incidents would be time- 
barred.  But in addition to many other instances of abusive and 
harassing behavior, Aman and Johnson point to several 
particularly troubling comments made in 1991 by current 
management level employees. 
         First, in a discussion with Johnson, Jim Newton, the 
district controller, stated that if things were not resolved with 
Aman, "we're going to have to come up there and get rid of all of 
you."  App. at 41.  When asked whom he meant by "all of you," 
Newton refused to answer.  Id.  Second, Robert Kurtz, the general 
manager, after slamming his hand on Aman's desk, told her that he 
knew all about her and two other employees.  The only factor the 
three shared in common was their race.  Id. at 316.  Third, in a 
district meeting attended by all administrative, sales, and 
warehouse employees, Kurtz stated that "the blacks are against 
the whites," and that if anyone did not like it at Cort 
Furniture, they could leave.  Id. at 323. 
     The district court's conclusion that harassment ended 
in 1989 appears to be based upon a belief that these later 
comments were not racially motivated.  Aman, slip op. at 12.  In 
our view, however, the use of "code words" can, under 
circumstances such as we encounter here, violate Title VII.  
Indeed, a reasonable jury could conclude that the intent to 
discriminate is implicit in these comments.  Cf. Andrews, 895 
F.2d at 1482 n.3 ("The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex 
in cases involving sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic 
materials, or sexual derogatory language is implicit, and thus 
should be recognized as a matter of course.").  There are no 
talismanic expressions which must be invoked as a condition- 
precedent to the application of laws designed to protect against 
discrimination.  The words themselves are only relevant for what 
they reveal -- the intent of the speaker.  See Futrell v. J.I. 
Case, 38 F.3d 342, 347 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that statements 
like "sharp young people" and that the employee was not a 
"forward enough thinker" could reasonably be interpreted as 
evidence of bias under the ADEA).  A reasonable jury could find 
that statements like the ones allegedly made in this case send a 
clear message and carry the distinct tone of racial motivations 
and implications.  They could be seen as conveying the message 
that members of a particular race are disfavored and that members 
of that race are, therefore, not full and equal members of the 
workplace.  As we have held, the pervasive use of derogatory and 
insulting terms directed at members of a protected class 
generally, and addressed to those employees personally, may serve 
as evidence of a hostile environment.  Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1485.  
Moreover, a reasonable jury could conclude that Kurtz's statement 
that "the blacks are against the whites" represents management's 
explicit recognition of a racially hostile environment at Cort 
Furniture. 
     In addition to those described above, Aman and Johnson 
testified to numerous other examples of harassment which, viewed 
in isolation, arguably may not have been motivated by racial 
animus.  For example, Aman alleges that her time cards were 
stolen, making it harder for her to perform her job.  Other 
employees physically snatched things from her.  Aman was falsely 
accused of wrongdoing on at least two occasions.  As discussed 
earlier, several employees, including a sales manager, ignored or 
refused to deal with Aman.  Johnson was informed on several 
occasions that Aman "had to go."  In addition, Kurtz yelled at 
Aman on a daily basis, and there is conflicting evidence as to 
whether he yelled at any white employees at Cort Furniture.  
After Aman and Johnson began complaining about racial 
discrimination, employees were asked to keep complaint lists 
about Aman.  Similarly, Kurtz withheld relevant financial 
information from Johnson and gave her orders that directly 
contradicted orders from the controller, Jim Newton, as well as 
company policy.  In response to one of these occasions, Newton 
slammed the door to Johnson's office and yelled at her.  Even 
though he apologized, he admitted that he had never behaved in 
this fashion toward anyone else. 
     In light of the suspicious remarks discussed above, a 
reasonable jury could interpret this behavior as part of a 
complex tapestry of discrimination when examined in conjunction 
with the comments made by Cort Furniture's employees and 
management.  As we have said, 
     A play cannot be understood on the basis of 
     some of its scenes but only on its entire 
     performance, and similarly, a discrimination 
     analysis must concentrate not on individual 
     incidents, but on the overall scenario. . . .  
     ` . . .  What may appear to be a legitimate 
     justification for a single incident of 
     alleged harassment may look pretextual when 
     viewed in the context of several other 
     incidents.' 
Id. at 1484 (quoting Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel Co., 863 
F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989)) (concluding that missing files, 
anonymous calls, and vandalism could be evidence of a hostile 
environment).  We do not imply that such acts of harassment must 
be accompanied by racially discriminatory statements.  Indeed, we 
have previously held that overt racial harassment is not 
necessary to establish a hostile environment.  See Andrews, 895 
F.2d at 1485.  All that is required is a showing that race is a 
substantial factor in the harassment, and that if the plaintiff 
had been white she would not have been treated in the same 
manner.  Id.  We simply note that the harassment of black 
employees, when combined with the discriminatory statements made 
by other Cort Furniture employees, can be viewed as making the 
plaintiffs' racial discrimination claim all the more compelling.  
This is especially true given that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that Cort Furniture's management was not only aware of 
these acts and statements, but was also a source of the 
harassment and comments. 
     Viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
parties, Aman and Johnson not only have established a prima faciecase of 
discrimination, but they have also provided sufficient 
evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude that they 
were subject to intentional discrimination on a regular and 
pervasive basis.  We conclude, therefore, that summary judgment 
as to Aman and Johnson's hostile environment claim should not 
have been granted. 
                   B.  Constructive Discharge. 
         In order to establish a constructive discharge, a 
plaintiff must show that "the employer knowingly permitted 
conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a 
reasonable person subject to them would resign."  Goss v. Exxon 
Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984).  In Goss, 
we upheld a finding of constructive discharge which stemmed from 
the reassignment of the plaintiff to a less lucrative territory 
based upon her sex.  In doing so, we found two factors to be 
particularly persuasive:  (1) the employee had lost confidence in 
herself and her employer; and (2) the reassignment represented a 
substantial cut in pay.  Id. at 888-89.  Similarly, in Levendos 
v. Stern Entertainment, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1231 (3d Cir. 1988), 
we reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment on a 
claim of constructive discharge, stating: 
         While we can imagine a maitre'd who might not 
         object to exclusion from management meetings, 
         denial of authority to order supplies, false 
         accusations of stealing from and drinking on 
         the job, and who might not be disturbed by 
         rumors and remarks that she would be replaced 
         by a male, her employer's refusal to talk 
         with her, and to find wine bottles in her 
         locker, we find that these events are clearly 
         not trivial. 
We held that a jury could ultimately decide that a reasonable 
person would be forced to quit.  Id. 
         With regard to Aman's constructive discharge claim, the 
district court held that:  (1) she had not put forth sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of racial discrimination; (2) the 
conditions could not have been intolerable as a matter of law 
because she remained in her job for approximately four months 
after claiming that they were intolerable; and (3) the specific 
events that prompted her departure were insufficient as a matter 
law.  Aman, slip op. at 16.  We will address each conclusion in 
turn. 
         Because we believe that Aman has provided sufficient 
evidence to support her claim of racial discrimination as 
discussed above, we will not repeat that discussion here.  
Suffice it to say that courts have found constructive discharge 
based upon a continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment over 
a period of years, Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 
1982); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and Aman 
has set forth sufficient facts so that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that her decision to leave was reasonable based upon the 
history of discriminatory treatment. 
         The district court's second and third conclusions must 
be addressed in tandem.  As an initial matter, we have rejected 
imposing an "aggravated circumstances" requirement upon 
constructive discharge claims.  Levendos, 860 F.2d at 1232 ("we 
cannot state as a broad proposition of law that a single non- 
trivial incident of discrimination can never be egregious enough 
to compel a reasonable person to resign.").  The fact that Aman 
had been subject to continuous discrimination during her 
employment could support a conclusion that she simply had had 
enough.  No other precipitating facts were legally required.  
Even if we did require aggravating circumstances, the courts in 
Nolan and Clark both found that a history of discrimination 
constituted aggravating circumstances and we see no reason to 
disagree with that conclusion.  Accordingly, the fact that Aman 
left four weeks after her attorney contacted Cort Furniture 
alleging intolerable conditions does not preclude a finding that 
a reasonable person would be compelled to resign under the 
circumstances.  A jury could conclude that the conditions of her 
employment were intolerable, and that while she had the fortitude 
to stay, her strength finally failed. 
     Finally, there is evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that the circumstances of Aman's employment changed 
during those four months.  When asked about the incidents 
prompting her decision to leave, Aman answered: 
     I believe being called in and told that I had 
     to be written up, this was after I tried to 
     cooperate with the work plan that had been 
     given me . . . Mr. Kurtz behaving badly to me 
     . . .  Making accusations that I wasn't doing 
     my job properly, the way he spoke to me, the 
     way he yelled at me and ordered me in his 
     office, disregarding my own supervisor and 
     doing it in front of other people. 
App. 287-88.  When asked what happened between the time her 
attorney first contacted Cort Furniture and her departure, she 
testified that the harassment "stepped up."  App. at 284-86.  
Specifically, after her attorney contacted Cort Furniture, Kurtz 
and other employees became even more abusive than usual.  It was 
during this period that Aman was informed that she was to be 
formally reprimanded and that employees had been instructed to 
compile complaint lists about her.  It was also after her 
attorney's letter that Kurtz made his statement that "the blacks 
are against the whites," and that those who didn't like it should 
leave.  Taken as a whole, a reasonable jury could certainly 
conclude that after being subjected to these conditions, Aman was 
constructively discharged. 
 
                    C.  Retaliatory Discharge. 
         To establish a prima facie case for retaliatory 
discharge, a plaintiff must show:  (1) that she engaged in a 
protected activity; (2) that she was discharged subsequent to or 
contemporaneously with such activity; and (3) that a casual link 
exists between the protected activity and the discharge.  Jalil 
v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989).  Cort Furniture 
argues, and the district court agreed, that Johnson was not fired 
for engaging in a protected activity because failure to 
participate in the internal investigation was a legitimate ground 
for her termination.  Aman, slip op. at 17.  Once again, this 
conclusion is not supported by the evidence when considered in 
the light most favorable to Johnson. 
         As a preliminary matter, protesting what an employee 
believes in good faith to be a discriminatory practice is clearly 
protected conduct.  42 U.S.C.  2000e-3(a); Griffiths v. Cigna 
Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 468 (3d Cir. 1993).  Thus, "a plaintiff need 
not prove the merits of the underlying discrimination complaint, 
but only that `he was acting under a good faith, reasonable 
belief that a violation existed.'"  Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 468 
(quoting Sumner v. United States Postal Service, 899 F.2d 203, 
209 (2d Cir. 1990)).  It is undisputed that Johnson complained to 
Cort Furniture's management about what she believed constituted 
discriminatory practices at Cort Furniture.  Thus, Johnson's 
numerous complaints about discrimination and her refusal to 
"gather" more derogatory information to place in Aman's file 
following Aman's termination, separate and apart from her failure 
to attend the deposition, represent activities protected under 
Title VII. 
         But the fact that her discharge did not immediately 
follow these activities does not undermine her claim.  We have 
held that the "mere passage of time is not legally conclusive 
proof against retaliation."  Robinson v. S.E. Pa. Transp. 
Authority, 982 F.2d 892, 894-95 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the 
evidence was sufficient to demonstrate retaliation for activities 
that occurred two years prior to the termination).  The issue 
remains whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson was 
discharged because she engaged in protected activity.  Cort 
Furniture has offered a facially legitimate reason for her 
discharge (her failure to attend the deposition), but has failed 
to demonstrate that Johnson cannot produce direct or indirect 
evidence to support her claim.  Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 899.  To 
the contrary, Johnson has provided sufficient circumstantial 
evidence so that a reasonable jury could conclude that she was 
retaliatorily discharged.  First, there is undisputed evidence 
that Johnson complained about discrimination at Cort Furniture.  
It is also undisputed that Johnson complained that Aman in 
particular had been treated unfairly, and that she repeatedly 
refused to "gather" more derogatory information against Aman so 
Cort Furniture "could win the case against her."  App. at 115-16. 
         It is also undisputed that Johnson was fired after she 
failed to appear for the deposition concerning Aman's employment 
at Cort Furniture.  Cort Furniture's explanation for Johnson's 
dismissal was that her failure to attend the deposition was 
evidence of disloyalty.  On the day she missed the deposition, 
she was told that "[y]ou have proven you are not loyal to this 
company, because of that I have to release you."  App. at 2.  It 
is worth noting that Johnson was not told that she was fired for 
insubordination or failing to comply with the company's internal 
policies.  Instead, the contemporaneous reason offered for her 
discharge was disloyalty.  In light of this evidence, Cort 
Furniture's decision to terminate Johnson could be seen as making 
good on Newton's threat to "come up there and get rid of all of 
you." 
         Moreover, Johnson has provided evidence which casts 
doubt upon Cort Furniture's reliance upon the deposition incident 
as the sole basis for her firing.  Specifically, Johnson 
testified that she called various employees in Cort Furniture's 
Human Resources Department to inform them that she was willing to 
participate in a deposition but wanted to consult with an 
attorney and with human resources.  Johnson testified that "I 
told [Kim Martin] . . . that I wanted to talk to my attorney 
before I went, and I wanted to talk to human resources before I 
went.  She said `fine, keep in mind they will keep asking you to 
take the deposition.'  I said, `I don't have a problem with that 
as long as I know what my rights are.'"  App. at 3.  Cort 
Furniture failed to offer any evidence to rebut this testimony.  
Thus, there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
conclude that Cort Furniture was aware that Johnson did not 
refuse to participate in the internal investigation, but merely 
requested some time to understand the nature of the proceedings 
in which she was asked to participate.  In light of this evidence 
and drawing all inferences in Johnson's favor, a reasonable jury 
could conclude that there was no disloyalty and that Cort 
Furniture's proffered reason is a pretext to mask a retaliatory 
motive. 
         Finally, the fact-finder would be entitled to consider 
all of the evidence of a hostile environment in order to 
determine the reason for Johnson's firing.  Evidence of 
discrimination against other employees or of a hostile work 
environment is relevant to "whether one of the principal non- 
discriminatory reasons asserted by [an employer] for its actions 
was in fact a pretext for . . . discrimination."  Glass v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 194. (3d Cir. 1994); Estes 
v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1104 (8th Cir. 1988) 
("Evidence of prior acts of discrimination is relevant to an 
employer's motive even where this evidence is not extensive 
enough to establish discriminatory animus itself.").  See alsoHeyne v. 
Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1995) (alleged 
sexual harassment of other employees other than plaintiff is 
relevant to prove employer's motive); EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 
31 F.3d 891, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1994) (evidence of employer's 
sexual harassment of female employees other than the plaintiff 
and evidence of disparaging remarks about women in general were 
relevant to determine motive).  As we have recognized, "an 
atmosphere of condoned [racial] harassment in the workplace 
increases the likelihood of retaliation for complaints in 
individual cases."  Glass, 34 F.3d at 195 (quoting Hawkings v. 
Hennepin Technical Center, 900 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1990)).  
Viewed in the light most favorable to Johnson, a reasonable jury 
could conclude that given her exemplary employment history and 
the general evidence of a hostile environment, Johnson was fired 
because she had protested discrimination at Cort Furniture, and 
Cort Furniture believed that her hesitancy to attend the 
deposition meant that she would continue to complain of 
discrimination and testify against Cort Furniture in Aman's EEOC 
investigation. 
                         D.  Unequal Pay. 
         The final claim raised by Aman and Johnson is a claim 
of discriminatory pay.  As the district court correctly notes, in 
order to establish a case of unequal pay, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate "that [they] were performing work substantially equal 
to that of [white employees] who were compensated at [] higher 
rate[s] than [they were]."  Hohe v. Midland Corp., 613 F. Supp. 
210, 214 (E.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd without op., 786 F.2d 1172 (8th 
Cir. 1976).  To support their claim that they were paid less than 
white employees, Aman and Johnson rely almost exclusively on a 
comparison of Cort Furniture employees' job grade levels.  With 
the exception of a single individual, Aileen Wilson who performs 
the same job as Johnson in a different office, they did not 
provide any evidence to demonstrate that the jobs performed by 
the white employees were the same or that the employees had 
similar credentials.  Cort Furniture responded by providing 
evidence that an employee's pay was not solely determined by job 
grade level, but by job duties and the differences in pay 
structure among the sales, warehouse, and administrative staff.  
Aman and Johnson have offered no evidence to rebut Cort 
Furniture's explanation, and at oral argument, they conceded that 
with the exception of the difference in pay between Johnson and 
Wilson, Cort Furniture's explanation of the pay differential 
between individuals with the same job grade was reasonable. 
     With respect to the pay disparity between Johnson and 
